RECENT CASES
that courts are unqualified or unable to reverse legislative determinations of policies
conducive to the general welfare. Consistency would therefore require avoidance of
judicial review in those cases in which condemnation may be justified only as an exercise of the spending power. How such avoidance of judicial review would be accomplished is a matter of conjecture. Perhaps the doctrines of "political question" or
7
"lack of sufficient pecuniary interest" used effectively in Massachusetts v. MellonW
could be expanded to fit the eminent domain cases. Again the Court might say that
discretion belongs to Congress, unless "the choice is dearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power."'28 It has even been suggested that to effect such avoidance the Supreme
Court should refuse to pass upon the constitutionality of federal action.29
If the courts insist that the eminent domain function may not supplement the spending power, the federal government might still accomplish numerous ends similar to
those accomplished in the instant cases by conditioning the award of grants-in-aid
upon compliance by the states with terms dictated by federal administrators.3o

Damages-Mitigation of Compensatory Damages-[Georgia].-When threatened
with a suit for injury from the presence of a foreign substance in a bottle of Coca-Cola,
the defendant Coca-Cola Company procured the installation of a device in the plaintiff's hospital room which enabled the defendant's agents to listen to and record private
conversations between the plaintiff and her husband, doctors, nurses, and friends. The
plaintiff sued for invasion of her right of privacy. The defendant sought to justify its
conduct on the basis of its right to protect its property against the plaintiff's allegedly
false claim of damage. The court held that although the plaintiff's claim and threatened suit did not justify the defendant's intrusion, the facts might be pleaded in mitigation of damages. McDanielv. Atlanta Coca-ColaBottling Co.,
It would seem that the court's refusal to allow the plaintiff's conduct to justify the
defendant's invasion is adequately supported by a strong social attitude against invasions of privacy.2 The Georgia court's decision that mitigation be allowed was based
on a state statute precisely in point;3 however, a Wisconsin court has reached a contrary result under a statute permitting, in an action for libel or slander, use in mitiga27 262 U.S. 447 (1923).

28Helvering

v. Davis, 301 U.S. 61g, 640 (1936).

29Nicholson, Federal Spending Power, 9 Temple L. Q. 3, 24 (r934). In the interest of
securing uniformity, it appears to be desirable that there be review by the federal judiciary
of the constitutionality of state legislation.
30 Missouri Utilities Co. v. California, 8 F. Supp. 454, 464 (Mo. 1934). Corwin, Spending
Power of Congress, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 548, 577 (X923).
z 2 S.E. (2d) 8io (Ga. App. 1939).
2 Conventional delineations of the rules guaranteeing privacy are broad and supported by
strong statements of policy. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(i8go); Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 Boston U. L. Rev. 353 (1932). Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o,5o S.E. 68 (igo5); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225,37 S.W.
(2d) 46 (I93I).
Eavesdropping was an indictable nuisance at common law, 2 Wharton, Criminal Law § 1718
(12th ed. X932). In Georgia, at least, eavesdropping has been condemned by statute as well,
Ga. Code (z933) § 26-2OO.
3Ga. Code (1933) § io5-i8o2: "Circumstances not amounting to justification may be pleaded in extenuation and mitigation of damages."
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tion of evidence denied effectiveness as a justification.4 If the position of the court denying justification is a sound one, use in mitigation of damages of the identical evidence
denied credence as a justification, would seem to be undesirable. The court in effect is
permitting justification, since to say that the defendant is wholly unjustified in inflicting
injury, but need not pay damages for the injury or need pay only nominal damages, is
to do by indirection what is not permitted directly. It is noteworthy that in the principal case the jury, after being permitted to hear the evidence in mitigation, brought in
a verdict for the defendant.s
Under the better view evidence in mitigation of damages is not permitted to mitigate compensatory damages actually sustained. 6 It is correctly permitted either to prevent assessment of greater compensatory damages than were sustained,7 or to prevent
assessment of punitive damages. 8 It is probable that in the principal case the court was
not motivated by the desire to prevent assessment of greater damages than the plaintiff actually suffered; nor, unless the conclusion is accepted that all damages permitted
for invasion of privacy are punitive in nature, could the court have been motivated by
the desire to prevent assessment of punitive damages. By use of the mitigation technique, the court permitted mitigation of compensatory damages actually sustained in
order either to punish the plaintiff by reduction of his recovery (in effect cross assessment of punitive damages), or partially to justify the conduct of the defendant. That
is, the court permitted mitigation either because the plaintiff's fault was such that he
did not deserve full recovery, or because the defendant's conduct was not so blameworthy as to require subjection to full liability.
To allow mitigation predicated on the fault of the plaintiff has serious implications.
A premium is placed upon invasion of privacy, by offer of at least partial amnesty, if
fault in the plaintiff can be discovered. Even commission of a crime does not bar the
door of a court to the plaintiff;9 it would seem that recovery should not be denied for an
admitted wrong on the ground that the plaintiff was contemplating a civil tort. The
analogy of the doctrines of contributory and comparative negligence, through which
4 Wis. Stat. (,937) § 263.38: "In an action for libel or slander the defendant may in his
answer allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of the damages; and whether he prove the justification or not he
may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances." The court stated that this did not permit
mitigation of compensatory damages actually suffered, Candrian v. Miller, 98 Wis. 164, 73

N.W. 1004 (x898).
It should be noted, however, that the Georgia provision is contained in the section on Torts,
while the Wisconsin statute is in the section labeled Pleadings.
s McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2 S.E. (2d) 8io, 814 (Ga. App. 1939).
663 A.L.R. 89o (1929).
7 Duval v. Davey, 32 Ohio St. 604, 612 (1877); Craney v. Donavan, 92 Conn. 236, 102
AUt. 64- (r917).
8Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. i (i8gi); Clair v. Battle Creek
3. Co., 168 Mich. 467,473, 13 4 N.W. 443, 445 (1z12); Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77 (1876); Taylor v. Hearst, iiS Cal. 366, 50 Pac. 543 (1897); Massee v. Williams, 207 Fed. 222 (C.C.A. 6th
1913). "Mitigating circumstances are those that affect the basis for an award of exemplary
damages, or reduce actual damages by showing not that they were never suffered, but that they
have been partially extinguished," McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 358 ,
i69 N.E. 6o5, 6og (193o).
9Brandeis, J., in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928).
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a plaintiff is deprived of his action because of his own wrong, should be mentioned in
order to be distinguished. There the negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant contribute to a single injury; here the torts of the plaintiff and the defendant each caused
a separate injury. The most persuasive argument in favor of the position of the court
is the suggestion that punitive damages should be mutualIo This view has been refuted
by Sutherland," particularly on the convincing ground that "aside from the ultra refinement it involves ....
the plaintiff is punished without cause-he may not have
violated the law." Furthermore, if the plaintiff has committed a legal wrong, the defendant may prosecute a separate action. In refutation of the contention that it is desirable to settle all problems in one suit, it is submitted that the issue is confused by
presentation of two different inquiries in a single lawsuit; the attention of the jury is
directed to the plaintiff's fault, to the neglect of his injury.
Mitigation predicated on the fact that the defendant is not blameworthy would
seem equally undesirable and perhaps anomalous. To allow the blamelessness of the
defendant to triumph completely, mitigation must be permitted, whether or not the
plaintiff is actually innocent of wrong, in every case in which a suit is contemplated
the bona fides of which the defendant justifiably doubts. This is obviously unjust to
innocent litigants. If, on the other hand, the fact that the defendant is not blameworthy is permitted to mitigate damages only when the plaintiff is actually guilty of
wrong, then the test of the defendant's merit is placed on an external factor over which
he has no control. To the suggestion that the defendant should be permitted to shoulder this risk, the refutation is again that such a decision places a premium on risking
commission of an admitted wrong.
In justice to the Georgia position it must be granted that the result is to some extent persuasive. The Coca-Cola Company, and many other purveyors of food and drink,
have been harassed by a multitude of fictitious claims; a weapon is here placed in their
hands to enable effective defense. An extremely flexible scale of damages permits the
jury to allow more accurately a recovery commensurate with justice under all the
facts. While it is likely that few would attempt to argue that the plaintiff's conduct
should be permitted to be pleaded in a burglary action or even in a civil suit for battery, desire to maintain the right of privacy may not be as powerful as the desire to protect against fictitious claims.
Perhaps the circumstance that creation of the tort was comparatively recent is indicative of absence of strong motivating policy. Certainly qualification of early expressions of its strength would not conflict with a powerful momentum. The jury is
given an opportunity to balance the social values of the conflicting interests here involved as reflected in the mores of the people. Under this view, the case is an example
of the ritualistic function of the law.xz In denying justification the court celebrated the
sanctity of the right of privacy, and conventional consistency; in permitting mitigation
it allowed the mores of the people to be effective.
Labor Law-Anti-injunction Act-Enjoining All Picketing after Violence Occurs[New York] .- Members of the defendant union committed several acts of violence while
picketing the plaintiff's premises during a labor dispute. Held, notwithstanding the
z16 Harv. L. Rev. 59' (i9o3).
"4 Sutherland, Damages § 1255 (4th ed. x916).
x2Arnold, Symbols of Government c. ii (ig35).

